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Abstract
This paper takes a first step towards a crit-
ical thinking curriculum for neural auto-
regressive language models. We introduce
a synthetic text corpus of deductively valid
arguments, and use this artificial argument
corpus to train and evaluate GPT-2. Signif-
icant transfer learning effects can be ob-
served: Training a model on a few sim-
ple core schemes allows it to accurately
complete conclusions of different, and more
complex types of arguments, too. The lan-
guage models seem to connect and gener-
alize the core argument schemes in a cor-
rect way. Moreover, we obtain consistent
and promising results for the GLUE and
SNLI benchmarks. The findings suggest
that there might exist a representative sam-
ple of paradigmatic instances of good rea-
soning that will suffice to acquire general
reasoning skills and that might form the core
of a critical thinking curriculum for lan-
guage models.
1 Introduction
Pre-trained autoregressive language models (LM)
such as GPT-2 and GPT-3 achieve, remarkably,
competitive results in a variety of language model-
ing benchmarks without task-specific fine-tuning
(Radford et al., 2019). Yet, it is also widely ac-
knowledged that these models struggle with rea-
soning tasks, such as natural language inference
(NLI) or textual entailment (Askell, 2020). Ac-
tually, that doesn’t come as a surprise, given the
tendency of humans to commit errors in reason-
ing (Kahneman, 2011; Sunstein and Hastie, 2015),
their limited critical thinking skills (Paglieri,
2017), the resulting omnipresence of fallacies and
biases in texts and the frequently low argumen-
tative quality of online debates (Hansson, 2004;
Guias¸u and Tindale, 2018; Cheng et al., 2017).
Neural language models are known to pick up and
reproduce normative biases (e.g., regarding gen-
der or race) present in the dataset they are trained
on (Gilburt, 2019); no wonder this happens with
argumentative biases and reasoning flaws, too.
This diagnosis suggests that there is an obvious
remedy for LMs’ poor reasoning capability: make
sure that the training corpus contains a sufficient
amount of exemplary episodes of sound reasoning.
In this paper, we take a first step towards the
creation of a critical thinking curriculum for neu-
ral language models. First, we design and build
a synthetic corpus of deductively valid arguments
which instantiate a variety of (syllogistic) argu-
ment schemes, and which are rendered as text
paragraphs (Section 3). Second, we use our syn-
thetic argument text corpus to train and to eval-
uate GPT-2 (Section 4). Evaluating the models’
ability to correctly complete conclusions of ar-
guments, we observe strong transfer learning ef-
fects/generalization: Just training the models on
a few central core schemes allows them to accu-
rately complete conclusions of different types of
arguments, too. The language models seem to
connect and generalize the core argument schemes
in a correct way. Moreover, tests with a sim-
ple hand-crafted argument produce evidence that
generic language modeling skill facilitates the suc-
cessful generalization of learned argument pat-
terns. These findings suggest that there might exist
a representative sample of paradigmatic instances
of good reasoning that will suffice to acquire gen-
eral reasoning skills. Such a collection might form
the core of a critical thinking curriculum for lan-
guage models.
Moreover, we test the trained models on dif-
ferent reasoning benchmarks. We obtain consis-
tent and promising results for the GLUE and SNLI
benchmarks, finding that training on core schemes
seems to slightly improve NLI skill. However,
training on the argument corpus doesn’t affect the
performance with regard to the semantically more
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demanding Argument Reasoning Comprehension
task or the critical thinking assessment compiled
in LogiQA. In the final section, we advance some
ideas for complementing the artificial argument
corpus so as to further improve the performance of
LMs with regard to these reasoning benchmarks.
A philosophical caveat: Throughout this pa-
per, we conceive of reasoning as a linguistic prac-
tice that is governed by specific (epistemological)
norms. Thus understood, a system possess rea-
soning skill if it is able to successfully engage in
this practice, and argumentation doesn’t necessar-
ily require mental activity.
2 Related Work
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to show
that autoregressive language models like GPT-2
can learn to reason by training on a text corpus
of correct natural language arguments. Previous
work in this field, in contrast, has modeled natu-
ral language reasoning problems as classification
tasks and trained neural systems to accomplish
them.
Rule-based natural language reasoning Vari-
ous datasets have been developed for rule-based
deductive reasoning in natural language. In these
tasks, one or multiple rules, i.e. (generalized) con-
ditionals, must be applied to a fact base in or-
der to deductively infer a conclusion. Facts and
conclusions are represented by atomic statements.
Rule application closely resembles the conclusion
completion task for generalized modus ponens and
generalized modus tollens schemes described be-
low. However, we go beyond previous work in in-
vestigating the ability of language models to in-
fer conclusions that have a more complex logico-
semantic structure (e.g., existential or universal
statements).
• The question answering bAbI dataset (We-
ston et al., 2016) contains a task which in-
volves applying very specific rules of the
form âA˘IJXs are afraid of YsâA˘I˙ to an in-
stance (for example: “Mice are afraid of cats.
Jerry is a mouse. What is Jerry afraid of?
A:cats”). Equally simple, one-step rule appli-
cations are tested in (Richardson et al., 2020),
and also contained in the QuaRTz dataset
(Tafjord et al., 2019).
• ROPES (Lin et al., 2019) is a reading com-
prehension task that involves applying back-
ground knowledge to a given situation (both
being presented as paragraph long text). Cor-
rect answers can be inferred by one-step rule
application; part of the challenge is to iden-
tify the relevant rule and fact in the text.
• RuleTaker, arguably the most general system
for natural rule-based reasoning so far, is a
transformer model that has been fine-tuned
to predict whether a conclusion can be in-
ferred from a set of rules and facts, not all
of which are necessarily required to draw the
conclusion (Clark et al., 2020). Moreover, in-
ferring the conclusion from the premise set
might involve multiple inference steps. The
authors show that the transformer model can
be trained to perform this task nearly flaw-
lessly and, moreover, to explain its infer-
ences. They also observe substantial transfer
learning effects.
Benchmarks for enthymematic reasoning An
‘enthymeme’ is an argument whose premises are
not explicitly stated, e.g.: “Jerry is a mouse.
Therefore, Jerry is afraid of cats.”
The Argument Reasoning Comprehension
(ARC) dataset (Habernal et al., 2018) comprises
simple informal arguments. Each argument
contains two premises: whereas the first premise
is explicitly stated, there are two alternative
formulations of the second premise. The task
consists in identifying which of these two alter-
native formulations is actually assumed in the
argument. For example: “Miss America gives
honors and education scholarships. And since
[scholarships would give women a chance to
study | scholarships would take women from the
home], Miss America is good for women.” ARC
therefore assesses the ability to make implicit
premises explicit. An adversarial ARC dataset
that eliminates clues in the original benchmark is
available (Niven and Kao, 2019).
CLUTRR is a task generator for relational rea-
soning on kinship graphs (Sinha et al., 2019).
CLUTTR takes a set of (conceptual) rules about
family relations as given and constructs set-
theoretic possible worlds (represented as graphs)
which instantiate these rules. In such a possible
(kinship) world, a target fact and a set of base facts
are identified such that the base facts together with
the rules deductively entail the target fact. The
task consists in inferring the target fact from the
base facts alone – the conceptual rules remain im-
plicit. For example: “Kristin and her son Justin
went to visit her mother Carol on a nice Sunday
afternoon. They went out for a movie together
and had a good time. Q: How is Carol related to
Justin? A: Carol is the grandmother of Justin.” So,
CLUTRR assesses entyhmematic deductive rea-
soning with implicit conceptual rules.
Critical thinking tasks LogiQA (Liu et al.,
2020) is a collection of publicly available criti-
cal thinking questions, used by the National Civil
Servants Examination of China to assess candi-
datesâA˘Z´ critical thinking and problem solving
skills. LogiQA covers tasks of various types: dif-
ferent kinds of natural language inference prob-
lems as well as the identification of implicit
premises or (practical) instrumental reasoning.
The tasks are shown to be hard for current AI
systems, of which a fine-tuned transformer model
performs best with an accuracy score of 35% – 50
percentage points below human performance.
3 An Artificial Argument Corpus
This section describes the construction of a syn-
thetic corpus of natural language arguments used
for evaluating and training GPT-2.1
The corpus is built around eight simple, deduc-
tively valid syllogistic argument schemes (top row
in Figure 1). These base schemes have been cho-
sen because of their logical simplicity as well as
their relevance in critical thinking and argument
analysis (Feldman, 2014; Bowell and Kemp, 2014;
Brun and Betz, 2016). Each of these eight base
schemes is manually varied in specific ways to cre-
ate further valid variants.
Negation variants of base schemes (second row
in Figure 1) are created by substituting a sub-
formula with its negation and/or by applying du-
plex negatio affirmat.
Complex predicates variants (third row in Fig-
ure 1) build on base schemes or their respective
negation variants and are obtained by substituting
atomic predicates with compound disjunctive or
conjunctive ones.
De Morgan variants of base schemes (fourth
row in Figure 1) are finally derived by applying
de Morgan’s law to the respective variants created
before.
1The corpus as well as the source code used to gen-
erate it will be released at https://github.com/
debatelab/aacorpus.
All in all, we thus obtain 71 different hand-
crafted argument schemes. Obviously, some of
these schemes can be derived from others. For
example, generalized modus ponens and general-
ized contraposition (base schemes) entail a nega-
tion variant of generalized modus tollens. Like-
wise, generalized contraposition and hypothetical
syllogism 1 entail a (negation variant of) hypo-
thetical syllogism 2.
In view of these interdependencies, three of the
eight base schemes are marked as core schemes:
generalized modus ponens, generalized contrapo-
sition, hypothetical syllogism 1.
Natural language instances of the argument
schemes can be created by means of a first-order-
logic domain (with names and predicates) and nat-
ural language templates for the formal schemes. In
order to obtain a large variety of realistic natural
language arguments, we have devised
• a multi-stage templating process with
• alternative templates at each stage and
• multiple domains.
As shown in Figure 2, this process can be split into
five consecutive steps.
In step 1, the argument scheme, which serves
as formal template for the natural language argu-
ment, is chosen.
In step 2, each sentence in the formal scheme
(premises and conclusion) is individually replaced
by a natural language pattern in accordance with a
randomly chosen template. For example, the for-
mula “∀xFx→ Gx” might be replaced by any of
the following natural language sentence schemes:
• “Every F is a G.”
• “Whoever is a F is also a G.”
• “Being a G is necessary for being a F.”
In step 3, the entity- and property-placeholders
in the resulting argument scheme are replaced
argument-wise with names and predicates from
a domain. (Each domain provides hundreds of
entity-names, which can be paired with differ-
ent binary predicates to create thousands of dif-
ferent unary predicates.) We hence obtain an in-
stance of the formal argument scheme as premise-
conclusion list.
In step 4, the premises of the natural language
argument are randomly re-ordered.
generalized 
contraposition
hypothetical 
syllogism 1
hypothetical 
syllogism 2
hypothetical 
syllogism 3
generalized 
modus tollens
disjunctive 
syllogism
generalized 
dilemma
ba
se
_s
ch
em
e
ne
ga
tio
n_
va
ria
nt
co
m
pl
ex
_p
re
di
ca
te
s
∀x Fx→Gx 
Fa 
——⇩—— 
Ga
∀x Fx→¬Gx 
Fa 
——⇩—— 
¬Ga
∀x Fx∧Hx→Gx 
Fa 
Ha 
——⇩—— 
Ga
∀x Fx→¬Gx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Gx→¬Fx
∀x Fx→Gx 
——⇩—— 
∀x ¬Gx→¬Fx
∀x (Fx∧Hx)→¬Gx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Gx→¬(Fx∧Hx)
∀x Fx→Gx 
∀x Gx→Hx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→¬Gx 
∀x ¬Gx→Hx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→Gx 
∀x Fx→Ix 
∀x Gx∧Ix→Hx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→Gx 
∀x ¬Hx→¬Gx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→¬Gx 
∀x ¬Hx→Gx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→¬(Gx∨Ix) 
∀x Hx→¬(Gx∨Ix) 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→Gx 
∃x Hx∧¬Gx 
——⇩—— 
∃x Hx∧¬Fx
∀x ¬Fx→Gx 
∃x Hx∧¬Gx 
——⇩—— 
∃x Hx∧Fx
∀x Fx→Gx 
∀x Fx→Ix 
∃x Hx∧¬(Gx∧Ix) 
——⇩—— 
∃x Hx∧¬Fx
∀x Fx→Gx∨Hx 
∀x Fx→¬Gx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→Gx∨Hx 
∀x Gx→¬Fx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→Gx∨Hx∨Ix 
∀x Fx→¬Gx 
∀x Fx→¬Ix 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→Gx∨Hx 
∀x Gx→Jx 
∀x Hx→Jx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Jx
∀x Fx→Gx∨Hx 
∀x Jx→¬Gx 
∀x Jx→¬Hx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→¬Jx
∀x Fx→Gx∨Hx∨Ix 
∀x Gx→Jx 
∀x Hx→Jx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Jx∨Ix
∀x Fx→Gx 
¬Ga 
——⇩—— 
¬Fa
∀x Fx→¬Gx 
Ga 
——⇩—— 
¬Fa
∀x Fx→Gx∧Hx 
¬Ga 
——⇩—— 
¬Fa
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∀x (¬Fx∧¬Ix)→Gx 
∀x Gx → Hx 
——⇩—— 
∀x ¬(Fx ∨ Ix)→Hx
∀x ¬(Fx∨Hx)→Gx 
¬Fa 
¬Ha 
——⇩—— 
Ga
∀x (Fx∧Hx)→¬Gx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Gx→¬Fx∨¬Hx
∀x Fx→¬(Gx∨Ix) 
∀x Hx→¬Gx∧¬Ix 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Hx
∀x Fx→Gx 
∀x Fx→Ix 
∃x Hx∧(¬Gx∨¬Ix) 
——⇩—— 
∃x Hx∧¬Fx
∀x Fx∧Ix→Gx∨Hx 
∀x Gx→¬Fx∨¬Ix 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx∧Ix→Hx
∀x Fx→¬(Gx∧Hx) 
∀x ¬Gx→Jx 
∀x ¬Hx→Jx 
——⇩—— 
∀x Fx→Jx
∀x Fx→Gx∧Hx 
¬Ga∨¬Ha 
——⇩—— 
¬Fa
n=2 n=2 n=2 n=3 n=3 n=3 n=2 n=2
generalized 
modus ponens
Figure 1: Syllogistic argument schemes used to create an artificial argument corpus.
In step 5, the premise-conclusion list is packed
into a text paragraph by adding an argument in-
tro, framing the premises, and adding an inference
indicator. Again, multiple templates are available
for doing so, which yields a large variety of textual
renderings of an argument.
Following this pipeline, we create 10,000 nat-
ural language instances of each formal argument
scheme, split into 9,000 train and 1,000 test items.
This represents the artificial argument text corpus
we use to train and evaluate GPT-2.
4 Experiments with GPT-2
We train and evaluate three compact versions of
GPT-2 with 117M, 345M and 762M parameters
respectively, all of which fall short of the full-
scale model with 1542M parameters (Wolf et al.,
2019).2
4.1 Training
The Artificial Argument Corpus comprises 71 *
9,000 training items that are grouped into three
training sets as follows (see also the color pattern
in Figure 1):
2The fine-tuned models will be relased through https:
//huggingface.co/models.
• TRAIN01: all training items which are in-
stances of a core scheme, i.e. generalized
modus ponens, generalized contraposition,
hypothetical syllogism 1 (N=27,000)
• TRAIN02: all training items which are in-
stances of a base scheme (N=72,000)
• TRAIN03: all training items in the corpus
(N=639,000)
In an attempt to avoid over-fitting, we blend
the training arguments with snippets from Reuters
news stories (Lewis et al., 2004) and the standard-
ized Project Gutenberg Corpus (Gerlach and Font-
Clos, 2018), trying a mixing ratio of 1:1. The dif-
ferent versions of GPT-2 are fine-tuned on each
of the three enhanced training sets. This gives
us nine fine-tuned model versions plus the three
BASE models to evaluate.
4.2 Results
Wiki103 Does fine-tuning on the (enhanced) ar-
gument corpus affect general language modeling
skill? We address this question upfront and re-
port the perplexity of our models on the Wiki103
dataset (split into sequences of 128 tokens), first.
Figure 3 shows that training on the argument cor-
pus drastically increases the Wiki103 perplexity.
Step 1: choose 
formal argument 
scheme
 artificial argument corpus config file
topic-neutral 
formal argument 
schemes
topic-neutral 
NL templates for 
formal sentence 
schemes
Step 2: choose & 
substitute NL 
schemes 
sentence-wise
Step 3: construct 
& substitute 
domain-specific 
predicates and 
names
domain-specific 
NL names and 
binary predicates
Step 5: construct 
& apply 
argument 
template
argument-, 
premise-, and 
inference-
indicators 
Step 4: 
permutate 
premises 
randomly
∀x Fx→¬Gx 
Ga 
——⇩—— 
¬Fa
No F is a G. 
a is a G. 
——⇩—— 
It is false that a is a F.
1. No sister of Lisa is a friend of 
Chloe. 
2. Susan is a friend of Chloe. 
——⇩—— 
3. It is false that Susan is a sister 
of Lisa.
1. Susan is a friend of Chloe. 
2. No sister of Lisa is a friend of 
Chloe. 
——⇩—— 
3. It is false that Susan is a sister 
of Lisa.
Here comes a perfectly valid 
argument: To begin with, Susan is 
a friend of Chloe. Moreover, no 
sister of Lisa is a friend of Chloe. 
In consequence, it is false that 
Susan is a sister of Lisa.
Figure 2: Pipeline for creating natural language instances of argument schemes with multiple templating.
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Figure 3: Perplexity on Wiki103 corpus.
Deterioration of overall language modeling skill
is most severe for the largest training set TRAIN03
and the large model version. The increase in per-
plexity caused by fine-tuning on the core schemes
is, in comparison, modest, though still significant.
This suggests that, in future work, a higher pro-
portion of common texts should be mixed into the
training data.
Conclusion Completion on Artificial Argument
Corpus To test whether language models can
reason correctly, we assess their ability to accu-
rately complete conclusions of arguments in the
artificial argument corpus. Here, we make use of
the fact that, by construction, the conclusion of ev-
ery argument in the corpus ends with a predicate
(a property-term such as “sister of Chloe” or “sup-
porter of Tottenham Hotspurs”). Two examples:
It is not always easy to see who is related
to whom – and in which ways. The fol-
lowing argument pertains to this ques-
tion: First premise: Every workmate of
Brad is a classmate of James. Second
premise: Every classmate of James is a
classmate of Theodore. So, necessarily,
everyone who is a workmate of Brad is
a [classmate of Theodore, too].
Consumer research aims at understand-
ing whether users of some products also
tend to consume other ones, or not.
The following argument seeks to clar-
ify some such relations: Whoever is a
rare consumer of Nag Champa soap is
at least one of these: a regular user of
TRESemmÃl’ shampoo, an occasional
purchaser of Finesse shampoo or an in-
frequent user of Matrix shampoo. No
rare consumer of Nag Champa soap is
a regular user of TRESemmÃl’ sham-
poo. Whoever is a rare consumer of Nag
Champa soap is not an infrequent user of
Matrix shampoo. So, necessarily, being
a rare consumer of Nag Champa soap is
sufficient for being an [occasional pur-
chaser of Finesse shampoo].
So, more specifically, our evaluation proceeds
as follows: we query the models with the argu-
ment texts except the final predicate, we let them
generate a conditional sample, and we calculate
the accuracy of thus generated completions.
Figure 4 reports the evaluation results in de-
tailed and differentiated ways. Its subplots are ar-
ranged in a grid that mirrors the organisation of ar-
gument schemes in Figure 1. Each subplot visual-
izes the ability of the models to correctly complete
arguments of the corresponding scheme. More-
over, each subplot compares the BASE models
(points at the very left) with the fine-tuned mod-
els trained on TRAIN01, TRAIN02, and TRAIN03
(in this order from left to right, see also Figure 5).
Finally, the color code in each subplot indicates
whether the corresponding scheme belongs to the
respective training set. In other words, the accu-
racy of models that have not been fine-tuned on
the particular scheme are plotted in green, the ac-
curacy of those that have been fine-tuned on the
scheme in blue.
We may observe, first of all, that even the BASE
models (only pre-training, no fine-tuning) display
a remarkable ability to correctly complete conclu-
sions of some kinds of arguments. For example,
GPT-2-762M achieves 50% accuracy in complet-
ing contrapositions, 30% accuracy in completing
generalized modus ponens, and still 20% accuracy
in completing disjunctive syllogism and dilemma
arguments. Moreover, the large BASE model is
more skilful than its smaller versions. These find-
ings further corroborate the hypothesis that NLMs
learn (basic) linguistic and reasoning skills “on the
fly” by training on a large generic corpus (Radford
et al., 2019).
What’s also plain from Figure 4 is that train-
ing on the argument corpus effectively improves
conclusion-completion-skill. Nearly without ex-
ceptions, the lines are monotonically upward slop-
ing and reach 100% accuracy levels as soon as the
model has been trained on instances of the corre-
sponding scheme.
Yet, the most striking results unveiled in Fig-
ure 4 concerns transfer learning/generalization,
i.e., the fact that training on a few schemes im-
proves reasoning skill with respect to all schemes.
To see this, let us compare the BASE models
with the models fine-tuned on the core schemes
(TRAIN01). The TRAIN01-models achieve max-
imal accuracy in completing the instances of the
three schemes they have been trained on (three
upper left subplots). Remarkably, though, these
models have also learned to complete arguments
of different types: They display accuracy levels
of 80% or higher for three quarters of the other
schemes and only struggle with complex variants
of disjunctive syllogism.
We take this to be a promising result: It suggests
quite generally that there might exist a represen-
tative sample of paradigmatic instances of good
reasoning that will suffice to acquire general rea-
soning skills. Such a collection might form the
core of a critical thinking curriculum for language
models.
Conclusion Completion on Hand-crafted Argu-
ment But how far do the skills acquired on (a
subset of) the artificial argument corpus general-
ize? We have checked the models by letting them
complete a conclusion of a simple hand-crafted ar-
gument:
[Hermes] Every philosopher is mortal.
Hermes is not mortal. Therefore, Her-
mes . . .
This text differs syntactically and semantically
from any argument possibly contained in the arti-
ficial argument corpus (where predicates have al-
ways the form “is/being a Y of X,” and no domain
covers philosophers or mortality). Obviously, it
follows that Hermes “is not a philosopher.” The
argument instantiates generalized modus tollens,
which is not a core scheme in TRAIN01. Can
TRAIN01-models nonetheless fill out the unfin-
ished argument in a sensible way?
Table 1 counts and compares the most frequent
completions generated by two TRAIN01 models
(762M and 117M) and by the large untrained
BASE model (762M). Exclusively the 762M-
model trained on the core schemes reliably pre-
dicts the correct conclusion. The other two mod-
els rather repeat a premise, add an independent
sentence or even generate a contradiction. This
is consistent with our previous statistical find-
ings. Remarkably, although both the small and
the large TRAIN01 models have been fine-tuned
on precisely the same arguments, only the large
model seems to correctly recognize the logical
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Figure 4: Accuracy of conclusion completions for instances of different argument schemes (see Figure 1) and four
model versions. See also the visual legend in Figure 5.
762M parameters
345M parameters
117M parameters
not trained on this  
argument TYPE
trained on this  
argument TYPE
BASE-models
TRAIN01-models
TRAIN02-models
TRAIN03-models
Figure 5: Detailed legend for Figure 4. In the illus-
trative accuracy plot at the right-hand side, the BASE
models as well as those models fine-tuned on TRAIN01
are plotted in green, since the base scheme of disjunc-
tive syllogism doesn’t belong to TRAIN01. However,
some arguments in TRAIN02 and TRAIN03 instanti-
ate the base scheme of disjunctive syllogism; thus the
blue markers.
762M 117M
Completion TRAIN01 BASE TRAIN01
. . . is not a philosopher. ? 92 3 3
. . . is immortal. = 8 14 1
. . . is not mortal. = 0 5 43
. . . is no mortal. = 0 0 2
. . . is mortal. † 0 11 18
. . . is not immortal. † 0 2 2
. . . is a philosopher. † 0 1 2
. . . does not exist. ◦ 0 3 0
. . . is not God. ◦ 0 4 0
others 0 57 29
Table 1: Absolute frequency of predicted completions
for the hand-made [Hermes] query by three different
models. Completions are entailed (?), redundant (=),
contradictory (†) or independent (◦).
structure of the [Hermes] argument. This suggests
that generic language modeling skill facilitates the
successful generalization of learned argument pat-
terns beyond the templates used to create the syn-
thetic training data.
To further understand transfer learning effects,
we next examine whether fine-tuning on the ar-
tificial argument corpus improves performance in
other NLP reasoning tasks.
GLUE AX The GLUE datasets (Wang et al.,
2018) represent standard benchmarks for natural
language inference (NLI). We evaluate our mod-
els’ NLI skill in terms of conditional perplexity on
the curated GLUE diagnostics dataset.
As we proceed in a similar way with regard to
other NLP benchmarks, we describe our evalua-
tion method in general terms, first. Using tem-
plates, we translate each benchmark entry into al-
ternative prompts (e.g., context and question) and
alternative completions (e.g., answers). For exam-
ple:
Prompt1: The girl is eating a pizza.
Therefore, . . .
Prompt2: The girl is eating a pizza. This
rules out that . . .
Completion: . . . the girl is eating food.
The correct match is obviously Prompt1–
Completion. The ability of a language model to
discern that “The girl is eating pizza” entails (and
does not contradict) “The girl is eating food” will
be reflected in a comparatively low conditional
perplexity of Completion given Prompt1 and a
correspondingly high conditional perplexity of
Completion given Prompt2. That is what our
metric measures.
Let us assume that there are n alternative
prompts p1, . . . pn and m alternative completions
c1, . . . , cm, with p∗, c∗ being the correct match-
ing. Moreover, nPP(c|p) refers to the normalized
conditional perplexity of the completion c given
prompt p,
nPP(c|p) := PP(c|p)
PP(c)
.
Now, our evaluation metric is the relative correct
perplexity generated by the model:
rcPP :=
1
nm
nPP(c∗|p∗)∑
i,j nPP(cj |pi)
.
For all benchmarks considered below, either
n = 1 or m = 1. (N.B.: If m = 1, PP(ci) will be
the same for all prompt-completion pairs and may
hence be dropped from the metric.)
Informally speaking, our metric measures
• the degree to which the correct prompt –
compared to the alternative prompts – makes
the corresponding (correct) completion more
likely (reduces its perplexity), or
• the degree to which a given (correct) prompt
makes the correct completion – compared to
the alternative completions – more likely (re-
duces its perplexity).
With these explanations in mind, let us turn to
the assessment of our models on the GLUE bench-
marks reported in Figure 6.
For the BASE models, the relative perplexity
scatters around one, whereas the models fine-
tuned on the three core schemes (TRAIN01) seem
to fare better, displaying significantly – though
not substantially – lower relative perplexity val-
ues. Far from being ground-breaking, an improve-
ment by two percentage points in terms of relative
perplexity is still a promising finding that points at
least into the right direction. In addition, concern-
ing BASE and TRAIN01 models, the large model
version achieves better results than the smaller
ones, as one would expect. However, whereas
the TRAIN01-models seem to slightly outperform
the BASE models, this does not hold for all the
TRAIN02- and TRAIN03-models anymore. Espe-
cially the performance of GPT-2-762M, when fine-
tuned on larger training sets, deteriorates back to
base-level. This might be due to the fact that
the TRAIN02- and TRAIN03-models (and espe-
cially the large versions thereof) suffer the loss of
generic language modeling skills (see Figure 3)
and hence are deprived of linguistic and factual
knowledge needed to address the NLI tasks. Yet,
this is currently but an explanatory hypothesis in
need of further investigation.
SNLI The SNLI dataset (Bowman et al., 2015)
is another standard benchmark for NLI. Like the
GLUE dataset, it consists in pairs of sentences
which entail, contradict, or don’t bear on each
other. The assessment of our models with re-
spect to SNLI data proceeds in close analogy to
the GLUE benchmark. Figure 6 reports its results.
These results are consistent with the previous
findings for the GLUE benchmark: First and
Figure 6: Relative perplexity on the GLUE diagnostics data, the SNLI dataset, the argument reasoning compre-
hension (ARC) benchmark, and the LogiQA dataset.
foremost, fine-tuning on the three core schemes
(TRAIN01) improves the performance by 1–2 per-
centage points. In addition, the large model
outperforms the smaller versions (for BASE and
TRAIN01). Finally, fine-tuning on the larger and
broader training set doesn’t lead to further im-
provements, on the contrary, relative perplexity in-
creases again, most remarkably for the large model
(762M parameters). (Again, this might be due to a
loss of generic language modeling skill.)
Argument Reasoning Comprehension Task
The Argument Reasoning Comprehension (ARC)
task (Habernal et al., 2018) assesses the ability to
identify a missing premise in an informally recon-
structed and not necessarily deductively valid ar-
gument. It is a multiple-choice task where two al-
ternative sentences are provided, one of which is
the missing premise.
We design and apply specific templates to con-
struct prompts and completions, and calculate rel-
ative perplexity as described above.
As shown in Figure 6, the findings are incon-
clusive. Larger models are not necessarily better
than smaller ones in this task, and training on the
artificial argument corpus doesn’t seem to have an
effect.
LogiQA The LogiQA is a collection of nearly
9,000 multiple-choice questions (four alternative
answers each) used in critical thinking assess-
ments. These questions span the whole range of
critical thinking tasks.
We design and apply specific templates to con-
struct prompts and completions (one prompt and
four completions per question), and calculate rel-
ative perplexity as described above.
As can be seen from Figure 6, training on the
artificial argument corpus has no effect whatsoever
on the ability of the models to handle the critical
thinking tasks collected in LogiQA.
5 Conclusion
This paper has taken a first step towards the cre-
ation of a critical thinking curriculum for neural
language models. It presents a corpus of deduc-
tively valid, artificial arguments, and uses this ar-
tificial argument corpus to train and evaluate GPT-
2 (Section 4). The observation of strong transfer
learning effects/generalization is its main finding:
Training a model on a few central core schemes al-
lows it to accurately complete conclusions of dif-
ferent types of arguments, too. The language mod-
els seem to connect and to generalize the core ar-
gument schemes in a correct way. Moreover, there
is evidence that generic language modeling skill
facilitates the successful generalization of learned
argument patterns. These findings are consistent
with previous work on rule-based reasoning (Clark
et al., 2020) and suggest that there might exist a
representative sample of paradigmatic instances
of good reasoning that will suffice to acquire gen-
eral reasoning skills. Such a collection might form
the core of a critical thinking curriculum for lan-
guage models.
Moreover, the trained models have been tested
on different reasoning benchmarks. We obtain
consistent and promising results for the GLUE
and SNLI benchmarks. But training on the argu-
ment corpus doesn’t affect the performance with
regard to the semantically more demanding Argu-
ment Reasoning Comprehension task or the criti-
cal thinking assessment compiled in LogiQA.
Our work suggests different directions for ad-
vancing the approach adopted in this paper and
further improving the general reasoning skill of
neural language models:
• The syllogistic argument text corpus might
be complemented with corpora of argu-
ments that instantiate different kinds of cor-
rect schemes, e.g., propositional inference
schemes, modal schemes, argument schemes
for practical reasoning, complex argument
schemes with intermediary conclusions or as-
sumptions for the sake of the argument, etc.
(Technically, we provide the infrastructure
for doing so, as all this might be achieved
through adjusting the argument corpus con-
figuration file.)
• To succeed in NLI tasks, it doesn’t suffice
to understand ‘what follows.’ In addition,
a system needs to be able to explicitly dis-
cern contradictions and non sequiturs (rela-
tions of logical independence). This suggests
that the artificial argument corpus might be
fruitfully supplemented with corpora of cor-
rectly identified aporetic clusters (Rescher,
1987) as well as corpora containing correctly
diagnosed fallacies.
• In addition, the idea of curriculum learning
for ML (Bengio et al., 2009) might be given
a try. Accordingly, a critical thinking cur-
riculum with basic exemplars of good rea-
soning would not only used to fine-tune a
pre-trained model, but would be employed as
starting point for training a language model
from scratch.
Natural language templating is a fundamental
technique used throughout this paper: both in con-
structing the artificial argument corpus as well
as in transforming the NLP benchmark datasets
into text that can be processed by language mod-
els. The concrete templates applied have been de-
signed in a trial-and-error process. It is far from
clear that these represent optimal choices for ef-
fectively eliciting a language model’s skills. Like
(Petroni et al., 2020), we may thus argue that our
findings establish lower bounds to the actual se-
mantic capabilities of the models. Still, following
(Jiang et al., 2020), it seems of great importance to
gain a more systematic understanding of different
templating strategies and their effects on metrics
based on accuracy and perplexity.
In conclusion, designing a critical thinking cur-
riculum for neural language models seems to be
a promising and worthwhile research program to
pursue.
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